Those who wish to inform themselves about the state of emotion research today are well advised to read the *Emotion Review*. The first journal of the International Society for Research on Emotion, *Emotion Review* was started in 2009, at a time when there was a groundswell of interest in affect among researchers in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere. From the beginning, the editors of *Emotion Review* conceived of the journal as a place where chiefly conceptual articles would be published in an effort to achieve an interdisciplinary, integrative view of the field. They opened its pages not only to the opinions of the best scientists working in the affective sciences but also to the ideas of historians, philosophers, and others with an interest in the emotions. As a result, the journal offers readers a highly accessible and informative picture of the state of play in contemporary emotion research.

But those same readers might be surprised or disconcerted to discover that there is no consensus regarding the science of emotion’s most basic assumptions. On the contrary, articles that directly contradict each other appear with regularity, as if criticisms that have just been raised have no bearing whatsoever on the present author’s claims and do not deserve even token acknowledgment. The impression left is of a scientific domain in stasis, one in which the majority of researchers cling to their contested positions and research strategies, leaving fundamental questions unresolved. This is all the more striking because the editors have repeatedly invited contributions and commentaries on pertinent selected themes, in which it might be expected that differences would be confronted and thrashed out. The situation is captured in James Gross’s paper “The Future’s So Bright, I Gotta Wear Shades” (2010), in which the author considers the future of emotion research. In a section that he describes as not for those readers who are “faint of heart,” he reviews the “many daunting conceptual and empirical challenges” facing the field before going on to recommend the “incredible conceptual and empirical opportunities” for research in a discussion that he warns readers to avoid “if you are prone to getting dizzy.”

I first turned my attention to the emotions around 2000, after completing a book on the genealogy of the concept of psychic trauma (*Trauma: A Genealogy* [Chicago, 2000]). I thought it was an interesting and important fact that in the third edition of the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* (1980) (DSM-III), when the American Psychiatric Association officially recognized Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, survivor guilt was included as a criterion for the disorder. But in the subsequent 1987 revision of DSM-III (DSM-III-R), this emotion was demoted to the position of merely an “associated” feature of the condition. In pursuing this topic, I came to realize that shame had taken the place previously attributed to survivor guilt, and the goal of my next book, subsequently published as *From Guilt to Shame: Auschwitz and After* (Princeton, 2007), was to explain why and in what terms the shift from guilt to shame had occurred. As a result, I began to immerse myself more generally in the literature of the emotion sciences.

One of the key figures in this development was the brilliant literary critic Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, who, starting in 1995, had launched the turn to affect in the humanities by drawing the attention of scholars to the work on shame of the American psychologist Silvan S. Tomkins (1911–1991). Sedgwick was convinced that Tomkins was a hitherto neglected but very significant thinker for those interested in theorizing the emotions. Yet, the more I looked into Sedgwick’s writings and Tomkins’s work, the more dubious I became about the claims of both authors. Moreover, Sedgwick believed she was delivering news about the relevance of Tomkins’s scientific ideas to contemporary debates about the emotions and selfhood, whereas in fact, as I soon discovered, those ideas had long been entrenched in American psychology and indeed had informed the chief paradigm in the emotion sciences, that proposed by Tomkins’s admirers and supporters Paul Ekman and Carroll Izard.

On evolutionary and other grounds, Tomkins and his followers posited the existence of a limited number of discrete, primary, or “basic emotions” as part of a universal human nature, emotions that were held to be characterized by signature facial expressions and specific patterns of behavioral and autonomic responses. Ekman’s assumptions and findings in particular dominated scientific research when I began investigating these topics. But I was not convinced that his claims were correct. On the contrary, I suspected that some of the iconic experiments Ekman had carried out were problematic, and I was interested to learn somewhat later that several scientists had questioned their validity. In particular, I discovered that already in 1994 Ekman’s former student Alan J. Fridlund and the psychologist James A. Russell had launched powerful critiques of the Tomkins–Ekman position, arguing that the experimental evidence cited in its support was inadequate and that the common interpretations of the results were unwarranted. It took me some time, though, to find my way to these authors’ publications, for the reason I mentioned at the start, namely, that scientists convinced of the validity of Ekman’s views routinely failed to acknowledge these or related criticisms that had been raised against them.

Take for instance what has arguably been the most influential book on the affects in recent times, Paul Griffiths’s *What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories* (Chicago, 1997). In this supremely confident work, Griffiths—a philosopher with a special interest in the philosophy of biology—launched a set of related claims and contentions. He staged his book as an intervention in the long-standing debate between the cognitivists, who had emphasized the importance of cognition, intention, and meaning in the emotions, and the noncognitivists, who had denied that cognition is a necessary condition for many emotional responses. Criticizing the cognitivists as armchair philosophers who indulged in conceptual analyses while ignoring empirical findings, Griffiths championed instead the Tomkins–Ekman “affect program theory,” or Basic Emotion Theory, as it has come to be called, as the correct scientific approach, at least for certain classes of emotional phenomena. I came across Griffiths’s book early in my research. To my mind, it was among the most illuminating works available at the time, steeped as it was in the latest results of various relevant sciences and committed as it also was to certain robustly defended arguments. Surprisingly, though, in his book Griffiths did not mention existing criticisms of Ekman’s work, especially the critiques that had recently been published by Fridlund and Russell, with the result that his perspective on the field came to strike me as skewed. As we shall see, Griffiths later acknowledged the interest if not the validity of those critiques, in order to defuse them. But in an important sense the damage had been done, because his 1997 book was widely read as definitively answering the most pressing issues in emotion research.

---


THE EMOTION PROBLEM, NATURALISM, AND THE AFFECT PROGRAM THEORY

But what were those pressing issues that had long divided the emotion field and that informed Griffiths’s decision to throw his lot in with Ekman’s position? As the philosopher Phil Hutchinson has recently emphasized, the fundamental “Emotion Problem” confronting scientists and philosophers alike has been the perceived need to resolve two apparently contradictory demands. On the one hand, there has been the felt requirement to acknowledge the intentionality of the emotions, that is, the fact or idea that emotions are directed at cognitively apprehended objects and are sensitive to “reasons.” Thus, when I am sad, I am sad about something—some object or situation—and the fact that my emotion is directed at such an object or situation is said, following the influential writings of the philosopher Franz Brentano, to give that emotion its intentionality or meaning. On the other hand, emotions—or at least some of them—appear to be common to both humans and nonhuman animals. But nonhuman animals as typically conceived lack the cognitive capacity, specifically the linguistic ability, to make propositions on which the intentionality of emotions has seemed to depend.

Faced with that apparent dilemma, theorists and researchers have tended to line up on opposing sides. On one side are the cognitivists—appraisal psychologists such as Richard Lazarus, social constructionists such as Rom Harré, and many philosophers, such as Anthony Kenny, Robert Solomon, Peter Goldie, and Martha Nussbaum—all of whom in the post–World War II period have stressed the intentionality of the emotions, but are thought to have trouble accommodating the existence of emotions in nonhuman animals (or in infants before they acquire language). On the other side are the noncognitivists—postwar psychologists such as Tomkins, Ekman, and Izard, and philosophers such as Griffiths—who, often influenced by Darwinian considerations and the work of William James, have emphasized the importance of bodily changes and subpersonal processes in the emotions but are seen to have difficulty explaining how it is that emotions have meaning.

In attacking the cognitivist position, Griffiths—who already in 1989 had rejected it as a degenerative research program—in his book listed several problems with the cognitivists’ views. In particular, he identified two difficulties that have repeatedly surfaced in critiques of this kind: the problem of so-called objectless emotions, such as states of depression or anxiety that seem to occur in the absence of intentional objects or any accompanying beliefs; and the problem of so-called reflex emotions (or what Griffiths also named “the problem of emotional recalcitrance”), in the grip of which, for example, a person may rationally believe that it is safe to fly but nevertheless remains terrified of flying. In this last connection, Griffiths also cited as evidence against the cognitivists the existence of affective responses that, as claimed by the well-known researcher Robert Zajonc, appear to be triggered by subliminal stimuli without the individual’s awareness or conscious cognition (WERA, 28–29).

Also central to Griffiths’s approach was an argument from homology, according to which similarities among animals based on a shared evolutionary history reflect real correspondences in nature. This was an argument that, by appealing to phylogeny or the evolutionary history of the species, justified treating the so-called primary or basic emotions as the same or similar in humans and many nonhuman creatures. Griffiths reasoned that even if, owing to evolution, the function of fear has been “subtly altered” by the different meaning of “danger” for, say, humans and


6. “The following facts are commonly cited as examples of ‘intentionality,’” the philosopher Hilary Putnam has observed in this regard: “(1) the fact that words, sentences, and other ‘representations’ have meaning; (2) the fact that representations may refer to (i.e., be true to) some actually existing thing or each of a number of actually existing things; (3) the fact that representations may be about something which does not exist; (4) the fact that a state of mind may have a ‘state of affairs’ as its object, as when someone says, ‘she believes that he is trustworthy,’ he hopes that his boss will get fired,’ ‘she fears that there won't be food in the house.’” Hilary Putnam, Representation and Reality (Cambridge, MA, 1980), 1.


chimps, the computational mechanisms used to process danger, along with the neural structures and systems implementing them, are very similar, thereby justifying the treatment of the basic emotions as alike in such animals (WERA, 213–16). Griffiths’s argument from homology relied in turn on a hierarchical view of brain function according to which the emotions shared by humans and nonhumans are controlled by phylogenetically old, subpersonal structures and processes. Those structures and processes are located in subcortical or “limbic system” brain modules that, according to his hypothesis, are informationally encapsulated in the sense that they are anatomically and functionally independent of the higher cognitive systems. Griffiths mentioned the amygdala—a small group of nuclei located subcortically in the brain—as one such limbic system module playing a crucial role in affective responses (WERA, 96). (The year before Griffiths published his book, on the basis of experiments on rats, the neuroscientist Joseph LeDoux had made the case for the amygdala as the seat of the fear response.)

Each of Griffiths’s assumptions had been challenged in the past. To take just one example, in a tradition going back to Wittgenstein and earlier, the argument had been made that a seemingly objectless or “undirected emotion,” such as anxiety, is not without an object, it’s just that the object, real or imaginary, is abstract, indefinite, diffuse, or vague. For a Freudian, alternatively, the object of the emotion exists, but the subject is unaware of it because it is repressed. However, Griffiths clearly felt that he had the philosophical and empirical resources to answer such objections. He therefore proceeded as if the key issues could now be settled in favor of the noncognitivist position, at least as regards the so-called primary or basic emotions.

In particular, he was convinced that the scientific evidence was on his side. He was persuaded that Ekman had demonstrated the existence of a set of universal, hardwired, discrete emotions or “affect program phenomena,” each characterized by signature facial expressions and distinct patterns of related behavioral, physiological, and autonomic nervous sys-

tem processes. In a chapter on the psycho-evolutionary approach to the emotions, Griffiths cited Ekman’s well-known cross-cultural judgment studies and laboratory experiments as proving that certain facial expressions of emotion, first discussed in the modern period by Darwin, are reliably associated with specific emotions in all human cultures (WERA, 51–55). That is, Griffiths treated Ekman’s research as decisive scientific evidence in favor of the view that the affect program phenomena are pan-cultural behavioral-physiological responses that can be discharged in an automatic, involuntary, noncognitive fashion by unlearned triggers. Although he recognized that, according to Ekman, such affect program phenomena may also be activated by culturally learned stimuli and their manifestations controlled by cultural conventions or “display rules,” Griffiths argued against the cognitivists by asserting that “The affect program phenomena are a standing example of the emotional and passionate. They are sources of motivation not integrated into the system of beliefs and desires. The characteristic properties of the affect program states, their informational encapsulation, and their involuntary triggering, necessitate a concept of mental state separate from the concept of belief and desire” (WERA, 243). Or, as he also observed: “The psychoevolved emotions occur in a particularly informationally encapsulated modular subsystem of the mind/brain. The processes that occur therein, the ‘beliefs’ of the system and the ‘judgements’ it makes, are not beliefs and judgements of the person in the traditional sense, any more than the ‘beliefs’ and ‘judgements’ of the balance mechanisms fed by the inner ear.”

Griffiths’s endorsement of the affect program theory was closely linked to another claim, fundamental to his project, namely, that emotions do not form a single category or “natural kind.” A natural kind approach takes it for granted that, as Robert Roberts has observed, the boundaries of categories, such as the affect program events, are “set by the nature of the phenomena under investigation” and not by the “limitations of scientific technique and interests,” because nature is carved at its joints. But Griffiths argued that it was necessary to assume a natural kind “pluralism,” according to which there are several natural kind emotional phenomena: the affect program theory accounts for a discrete number of primary affects, whereas the so-called “higher” or “cognitive” emotions, such as guilt, envy, jealousy, and shame (and even some categories of anger and

disgust), constitute a different “kind” or category of emotion, requiring an alternative explanation.14

Griffiths described those higher emotions as marked by certain features, such as their cultural variability, the fact that they are not brief but are sustained over time, their lack of stereotypical behavioral and physiological attributes, and above all their integration with complex, often conscious cognitive processes such as beliefs and desires “in a way quite alien to the affect program model” (WERA, 102). These “higher” emotions were of course the types of emotion that had been paradigmatically viewed as intentional states. But because, as Griffiths himself admitted, he did not have a firm explanation for those more complex or higher emotions, he left the impression that in his effort to explain them he had postponed rather than fully elucidated the problem of intentionality or meaning. Moreover, it was evident that a great deal hung on his commitment to Ekman’s affect program theory: if the solidity of that theory was doubtful, as certain emotion scientists contended, then not only would Griffiths’s position be undermined, but the very distinction between the basic affects and the cognitive emotions on which his scheme depended would be compromised.

THE PROBLEM OF INTENTIONALITY

How central the problem or question of intentionality has remained to the study of the emotions is evident in a more recent work by a philosopher who, convinced of the validity of Ekman’s affect program theory, also takes aim at cognitivism. In his book Passionate Engines: What Emotions Reveal About Mind and Artificial Intelligence (Oxford, 2002), Craig DeLancey follows Griffiths’s lead by proposing what he regards as a much-needed corrective to various cognitivists who fail to take advantage of the “best scientific understanding” that emotion research has to offer.15 He aggressively denounces philosophers such as Donald Davidson and John McDowell for several sins (PE, 49–67, 142–47), especially for ignoring discoveries that he believes support Ekman’s affect program theory, discoveries

DeLancey then offers as a solution to the “emotion problem” along lines very close to those put forward by Griffiths.

We therefore find in DeLancey’s book the same depreciation of the role of reason and intention in certain emotional responses; the same commitment to a pluralism of natural kinds, so that Ekman’s affect program phenomena can be seen to form a class of emotions distinct from other kinds of affects; the same adherence to the idea of the homology between humans and nonhuman animals such that the basic emotions are said to be found across different species; the same hierarchical view of brain function, with the accompanying claim that the affective and cognitive systems are subserved by separate anatomical-neural structures or modules; and the same resort to subpersonal processes to explain the affect program phenomena.16 Nowhere in his book, though, does DeLancey acknowledge any of the scientific criticisms of Ekman’s affect program theory, criticisms that by 2002 even Griffiths had started to confront.

Nevertheless, DeLancey’s work is of interest, in part because he tries to address that feature of cognitivism which, as he acknowledges, has made it so appealing, even convincing, to so many: its ability to explain the intentionality or meaningfulness of the emotions. As he puts it:

[C]ognitive theories are perhaps most compelling when they are used to account for those features of emotion that ally them with what would normally be called cognitive features. These include the intentionality of emotions (the fact that they are often in some sense “about” something), their evaluative nature (they are often like judgments, which can be seen as evaluations made by the subject), and their interesting connections to rationality…These are all features for which any theory of emotion should account. (PE, 43–44)

What is noteworthy is that, in order to respond to the necessity of solving the problem of the intentionality of the emotions, DeLancey provocatively suggests that the affect program theory itself can clarify the issue even more effectively than cognitivist theories are able to do. Because Ekman and Tomkins had explicitly presented the affect program phenomena as

14. In fact, in his book Griffiths divided the “higher cognitive emotions” into two discrete types, “irruptive motivations” (which he viewed as passive emotional states that overwhelm the subject) and “disclaimed” or “socially constructed” emotions (WERA, chapters 5 and 6). He left open the question of whether the latter constitute a discrete natural kind.

15. Craig DeLancey, Passionate Engines: What Emotions Reveal About Mind and Artificial Intelligence (Oxford, 2002); hereafter abbreviated as PE.

16. A cognitivist might reply to DeLancey that the latter begs questions when he offers certain problematic cases as counterexamples to the view that emotional responses are reducible to, or depend on, cognition. As one example of a response that he considers independent of belief and desire and hence a “purely expressive action,” DeLancey mentions “jumping for joy upon getting some good news” (PE, 52). But a critic might object that a person won’t jump for joy unless she understands the news, and if she understands the news she is already doing cognition.
independent of intention, DeLancey appears to break new ground. In a
discussion that until that point had been relentlessly hostile to appeals to
ordinary language usage in emotion theory as a form of empty conceptual
talk, he considers "grammatical" evidence about how we normally speak
about our emotions—as when we say we are angry at another person,
or are afraid of a dog or snake—in order to introduce a terminological
distinction that he believes allows him to perform the necessary work
of analysis.

He observes in this regard that the word "object" can be ambiguous
because it refers both to "whatever thing an intentional state is directed
at, or to a (potentially) concrete thing in the world" (PE, 89). In order to
resolve this supposed ambiguity, DeLancey distinguishes between the in-
tentional object defined as "a kind of logical term," referring to "whatever
thing to which the intentional state is directed," and the "concretum," de-
veloped as "a concrete object (e.g., a snake)—a concrete object that, in
conformity with Brentano's views, can be either actual or imagined. DeLancey
therefore argues that "Objects therefore include not only concreta, but
also events or states of affairs (that is, the referents of propositions), either
real or possible or imagined" (PE, 89).

On the basis of this somewhat murky distinction, the author then prop-
oses that Ekman's affect program phenomena can be defined as inten-
tional simply because they are, as he puts it, "directed at" a concrete ob-
ject or concretum. Thus, according to DeLancey, while certain instances of
the basic emotions can be understood in terms of propositional mental
content of the kind "Eric is afraid [because he believes] that the rattlesnake
will bite him," some basic emotions "can occur in forms where their
intentionality is only sufficiently described as concretum directed" (PE,
90). He gives the following example: if Tony is mad at Eric not for one
particular act but for a long list of acts, yet Tony can't easily remember all
the reasons he is mad at Eric, then in such a case the role of beliefs is so
weak that "it starts to become not some identifiable thing that constitutes
or causes the anger, but some vague collection with perhaps some ex-
tremely general shared properties (slights, inappropriate behavior toward
the agent, etc.)." In short, DeLancey contends that if the only thing that
is common to all the possible intentional contents in such a list of propos-
itions is "the concretum Eric," then "why assume that any old proposition
will do, as opposed to the concretum term 'Eric'? Thus, if this case is
possible, it shows that the best explanation in such a case is that the basic
emotion is directed at a concretum (Eric), not at some events or states of
affairs" (PE, 91).

DeLancey adds that much scientific evidence is "clearly consistent" with
a concretum-directed interpretation. Among the findings he cites are
Zajonc's claims for the existence of affective preferences stemming from
subliminal exposure to stimuli apparently independently of reportable
memories of the event; the results of fear-conditioning experiments; the
production of emotional responses by direct stimulation of subcortical
systems in the brain; the behavior of nonhuman animals who lack propos-
sitional attitudes, as when a rat flees a cat; and, "perhaps most impor-
tant," instances of basic emotions for which "no gloss into a propositional
attitude is going to be able to capture the same content." He gives as an
example of the latter the inherited human predisposition to fear snakes or
spiders because in such cases "there may be fear of a concretum for which
there is no appropriate kind of believed sentence" (PE, 93).

DeLancey does not deny that propositions may be an irreducible fea-
ture of even certain "basic emotion" responses in humans, because the
sentences in which we describe our feelings can't be reliably translated into
equivalent instances of concretum-directed intentional states (PE,
93). His aim, rather, is to propose the existence of a heterogeneous inten-
tionality of basic emotions, grounded in an argument for the plurality of
natural kinds, to the effect that some emotional responses in humans are
intentional because they have propositional content, while other, more
fundamental, emotional responses shared by humans and nonhuman
animals are also intentional in the minimal sense of being "directed at"
concrete objects. In this scenario, as Griffiths has recently summarized
DeLancey's position, basic emotions "can be intentionally directed at a
state of affairs, so their content is a proposition. For example, I may be
afraid that this dingo may bite me." But, as Griffiths goes on to remark:

the very same emotion may be intentionally directed at what De-
Lancey calls a "concretum," meaning an object as such, rather than
as an element in a proposition. For example, I may be afraid of this
dingo. This is where affect-program theory comes in. Because emo-
tions are intrinsically action-directing, an emotion whose content
is a concretum can nevertheless explain action. I flee the dingo
because I am afraid of it. In order to flee I do not need a proposition
about the dingo, such as that it is dangerous or that it will bite me,
combined with a desire to avoid danger or not to be bitten. I just
need to be afraid, and for the target of my fear to be the dingo. What
we have in common with other animals, DeLancey argues, is the
ability to have emotions that are intentionally directed at a concre-
Cognitivists might protest that DeLancey's argument amounts to nothing more than sleight of hand: he simply redefines as "intentional" what, under the terms of the affect program theory, had been considered causally induced, quasi-reflexive responses functioning independently of the beliefs, desires, and cognitions that, as he himself notes, are usually held to be intrinsic to intentionality. Critics might point out in this connection that the little words "directed at," as in the statement that the rat's fear is "directed at" the cat—words that are repeatedly deployed by DeLancey to describe such basic emotion responses—are here doing a lot of work; these words obscure from view, or appear to deny, what DeLancey elsewhere in his book quietly recognizes, namely, that according to the affect program theory, the objects or "concreta" he designates as the intentional objects are in fact simply the "mere stimuli" or "elicitors" that "trigger" the basic affect programs (PE, 92, 96, 99, 214). In short, critics might argue that DeLancey simply reverses the relationship between stimulus and response posited by the affect program theory by treating the cause of the emotional response as its supposed intentional object. The result is that he illegitimately applies the notion of intentionality to actions that lack the attributes of intentionality since they are, by definition, subpersonal, quasi-reflexive emotional reactions that function independently of cognitions, beliefs, and desires.

Griffiths, "Current Research in Philosophy," 216–17. Griffiths's statement is strange because it seems to suggest that propositions are external to and independent of the emotions themselves, indeed that propositions are in some sense the objects at which the emotions are "directed." This contrasts with Wittgenstein's claim that beliefs and cognitions are constitutive of the emotions and that it belongs to the "grammar" of emotions that this is the case. As Ter Hark has stated of Wittgenstein's position in this regard, emotions are "constituted by beliefs, and vice versa" (Ter Hark, Beyond the Inner and the Outer, 197). Or, as Ter Hark has also remarked of Wittgenstein's views: "The language-game I am afraid already contains the object . . . The concept of emotion is internally related to an object at which the emotion is directed. If the relation is internal, this entails that the description of an emotion is at the same time the description of the object of emotion—not the cause . . . This is not to reject a causal explanation, but merely to put it in its place: an inventory of causes is not constitutive of the language-game of emotions. We could, for instance, describe all the causal happenings when we cry without mentioning what we are crying about . . . But as long as we have not mentioned what we are crying about, we have not described an emotion" (217–18).

17. Although, as Hutchinson has observed, even a "pure cognitivist" such as Robert Solomon does not hold that emotions necessarily have propositional content, suggesting that Griffiths runs the risk of erecting as his nemesis "no more than a straw man" (Shame and Philosophy, 87).

19. In Mind and World, McDowell took his argument to imply the existence of a fundamental difference between humans and nonhuman animals based on the equation between human conceptuality and propositional attitudes (or the human capacity for language). But, persuaded especially by some arguments by the philosopher Charles Travis, he has recently modified his position. McDowell now suggests that perceptual conceptual content is not propositional but "intentional" in Kant's sense. See McDowell, "Avoiding the Myths of the Given," in John McDowell: Experience, Norm,
McDowell is one of DeLancey’s targets in his critique of cognitivism. But Hutchinson’s main McDowellian objection to the views of Griffiths and other like-minded authors (although he does not mention DeLancey) is that they are in the grip of the wrong picture of how the mind relates to the world. Griffiths and DeLancey assume that the mind is linked to the world in an external fashion, in the sense that the intentional states held to characterize the mind are understood as added on to, or derived from, a nature that is defined in modern, post-Cartesian terms as intrinsically meaningless. The challenge for these authors is therefore to show how intentionally can be explained naturalistically by locating its origin in, or reducing it to, non-semantic, physical properties. As Jerry Fodor, one of the most influential post–World War II architects of naturalism in the philosophy of mind, has stated of the goals of this project: “It’s hard to see . . . how one can be a Realist about intentionality without also being, to some extent or other, a Reductionist. If the semantic and the intentional are real properties of things, it must be in virtue of their identity with (or maybe of their supervenience on?) properties that are themselves neither intentional nor semantic. If aboutness is real, it must be really something else.” Or, as he has also observed: “Here, then, are the ground rules. I want a naturalized theory of meaning: a theory that articulates in non-semantic and non-intentional terms, sufficient conditions for one bit of the world to be about [to express, represent, or be true of] another bit.”

This was precisely the program of the cognitive science revolution in the post–World War II period. Indeed, Fodor was one of the architects of cognitive psychology’s goal to naturalize mind and meaning by positing the existence of mental representations and processes “in the head” and by making explicit the causal laws that were held to govern those representations. It was widely accepted by those committed to the cognitive science program that the computer provided the best model for such a reductionistic claim about the mind by explaining intentionality as the effect of the computational processing of the hypothesized mental representations.

and Nature (Oxford, 2008), 1–14; Charles Travis, “Reason’s Reach,” in ibid., 176–99; and McDowell’s response to Travis, in ibid., 334–35. Meanwhile, influenced by McDowell, Travis, and others, as I have observed, Hutchinson has made the case for a cognitivism that is not committed to a propositional attitude account of mental content. For a succinct statement of his position, see also Hutchinson, “Emotion—Philosophy—Science,” in Emotions and Understanding: Wittgensteinian Perspectives, eds. Yvonne Gustafsson, Camilla Kronqvist, and Michael McEachrane (Basingstoke and New York, 2009), 60–80.


As heirs to that same cognitive science program, Griffiths, DeLancey, and other like-minded emotion theorists therefore assume that the contents of intentional states ought to be explicable in terms of internal representations in the mind-brain, and that each representation’s content must be reducible to physical properties and causal processes. How successful such materialist, reductionist projects have been is an open question.

But Hutchinson follows McDowell in arguing that we don’t have to accept this account of how the mind relates to the world. As he puts it, the picture proposed by Griffiths and other like-minded theorists is one that presupposes a disenchanted and non-conceptual world, which stands external to our minds. This world is located outside the space of reasons, is governed by purely causal laws, and thus can only have causal impact upon us. It presupposes that our minds are located in our heads (and modelled on, or taken to be, the brain). The world only gains meaning, becomes enchanted, through our cognitively projecting values/meaning onto it, or more accurately, projecting values onto the impressions it causes on our senses. If we assume such a world to be our world . . . and if . . . not all emotions involve cognition, how then, indeed, how can all emotions be meaningful? (Shame and Philosophy, 118–19)

Rejecting such a picture of mind-world relations, Hutchinson argues instead that

There are other ways to understand human cognitive powers, the human mind, and the world in which we live with others . . . We do not . . . situate the world in some brute Given realm (outside the space of reasons), thus creating for ourselves the problem as to how things caused by this Given realm can give rise to meanings in, and for, us minded animals, operating within the space of reasons. Of course if one characterizes things in that . . . way, we will have a pretty serious problem and pretty serious trouble in finding the resources to overcome the problem.

We can . . . rather see the mind as a structured system of object-involving abilities; we can see our cognitive powers as our having grasped concepts, learnt how to employ them in contexts, through recognising their significance, for ourselves and for others, recognising their place in a life, and being able to respond to requests for reasons for our actions. We can understand the world and our mental capacities as internally related, rather than externally (causally) so. The world is our world; our minds reach out to meet it, or rather

Setting the Stage [15]
they think of it and act in it... I do not interpret sense data; I see the world. Furthermore, I convey what I see to you, employing concepts that we both have grasped. (Shame and Philosophy, 118–19)

In these passages, Hutchinson refers only to human capabilities, but as noted, his cognitivism extends to nonhuman animals. According to him, many of these, too, can be understood to have conceptual-intentional capabilities of various degrees of sophistication, even though the evolution of the human mind-brain has brought it with it capacities for symbolic representation more complex than the conceptual abilities of even its closest nonhuman relatives.

It seems to me that Hutchinson’s is the most interesting alternative to the noncognitivism of Griffiths and DeLancey and to various existing cognitive theories of emotion. He follows McDowell in rejecting as inadequate a “bald” or “restricted” naturalism of the kind adopted by Griffiths (and DeLancey), a naturalism that, in invoking Ekman’s affect program theory and related ideas, marginalizes the intact person with his or her intentions and meanings and raises difficult questions about how conceptuality can be added on to nonconceptual mental contents and processes. In fact, one of the objections raised by Hutchinson and other critics against Griffiths and like-minded theorists of emotion is that they often end up more or less surreptitiously transferring to subpersonal mechanisms the very powers of “cognition” and meaning-making they deny the person—as when DeLancey attributes to nonconceptual and noncognitive affect programs located subcortically in the brain the very “intentionality” he has denied to the individual. Bennett and Hacker have called this maneuver the “mereoological fallacy,” by which they mean the fallacy of mistake of referring to a part what properly belongs to the whole person or organism. 23

In place of such a restricted naturalism, Hutchinson follows McDowell’s lead in accepting a “liberal”—or what in the same spirit the philosopher Jennifer Hornsby calls a “naïve”—naturalism, a naturalism that takes in its stride the idea that forms of mindedness, such as intentional mental states, are through and through a part of the natural world and not alien or external to it, as post-Cartesian forms of naturalism, including modern cognitive psychology, assume. 24 Hutchinson’s objections to the restricted naturalism of Griffiths and other noncognitivists resonate with the work of other scholars and critics, such as Vincent Descombes, Meredith Williams, Stuart Shanker, Jeff Coulter, and Wes Sharrock, all of whom on Wittgensteinian and related philosophical grounds have argued powerfully against the cognitive science thesis that the correct way to understand mental phenomena is by locating them inside the skull “in the internal flux of representations.” 25

---

23. For a defense of McDowell’s view on rationality and a critique of “tack-on” theories of conceptual content suggesting that concepts can be added on to a more primordial system governed by raw sensory inputs, see Matthew Boyle, “Essentially Rational Animals,” in Rethinking Epistemology, eds. Abel Günter and James Conant, vol. 4 (Berlin and Boston, 2012), 395–427; and idem, “Additive Theories of Rationality: A Critique,” Journal of European Philosophy, in press. In a paper on the importance of the distinction between personal and subpersonal mechanisms (or information-processing mechanisms) in the work of Daniel Dennett, McDowell remarks: “What could an internal information-processing device really tell an animal? To give a positive answer, we would need to deal satisfactorily with the question... about how to make sense of the frog’s being on the receiving end of ‘sub-personal’ telling; but my point now is not that we have no inkling how that might be done. What could an information-processing device really tell anything (including another component in a sub-personal or ‘sub-personal’ informational system)? It is essential to realize that the answer to this question can be—in fact is—‘Nothing; without the slightest threat being posed to the utility, or even the theoretical indispensability, of cognitive science” [John McDowell, “The Content of Perceptual Experience,” in Mind, Value, and Reality (Cambridge, MA, and London, 1998), 350]. Hutchinson agrees with McDowell’s answer to his own question, but disagrees with the conclusion McDowell draws regarding the lack of threat to cognitive science. In Hutchinson’s view—and I agree with him on this point—McDowell’s philosophical position does challenge the utility and theoretical indispensability of much of the work by Griffiths and others that has been carried out on the emotions in the name of that science (Shame and Philosophy, 171–72, n. 14).


Rather, such critics locate mindedness in the public expressions and exchanges between persons or between nonhuman animals. They reject as misguided the idea that mental phenomena must be understood in terms of raw sensory Givens and internal representations defined as computational or non-semantic processes to which meaning is somehow tacked on. We might put it that for these critics the emphasis falls instead on the "ecological" or "ethological" determination of the behavior and interactions of intact animals in their natural or ordinary settings and contexts, which is to say, in the determination and understanding of human and nonhuman animal "forms of life." What the implications of such a relaxed or naïve naturalism might be for the possibilities of a science of emotion are unclear, which is to say that it remains to be seen what empirical research projects comport with the kind of embodied world-taking cognitivism advocated by Hutchinson—a topic on which I hope to throw some light in this book.

A word here about the term "cognitive." It should be apparent by now that the term has several meanings. In particular, it can suggest a concern with what is known as "cognitive psychology," which is very far from the meaning attached to the term by Hutchinson and other theorists who reject the assumptions of "cognitive science," above all the reductionist assumption that intentionality can be derived from nonconceptual and non-semantic processes. It is also worth remarking that the kind of cognitivism advocated by Hutchinson and others is sometimes reproached for offering too intellectualist or disembodied an account of emotional behavior, as if emotions can be explained by appeal to a disembodied mind or set of beliefs. But there is nothing about the "world-taking cognitivism" position that is opposed to the idea that humans and nonhuman animals are embodied creatures and that this fact is of the highest importance.

Hutchinson's goal is to analyze the conceptual-philosophical problems inherent in recent approaches to the emotions, not to examine the genealogy of scientific research on the affects. Yet the history of developments in the science of emotion reflects several of his main concerns. As we have seen, the anti-intentionalism so pervasive today in emotion theory and research has a genealogy that for our purposes can be traced back to developments in the psychological sciences beginning in the early 1960s. At that time two very different scientific approaches to the emotions were simultaneously proposed. One approach, first published in 1962, was associated with the work of Tomkins, who argued that the affects and cognition constituted two entirely separate systems, and that accordingly the emotions should be theorized in anti-intentionalism terms. His views were taken up and elaborated in active research programs by Paul Ekman and Carroll Izard. The other approach, associated with a famous (if problematic) experiment by Stanley Schachter and Jerome Singer, published in 1962, claimed to demonstrate that cognition and a neutrally valenced physiological arousal mutually constitute emotion.

At first the Schachter–Singer "cognitive" model of the emotions or other variants of cognitivism prevailed. Thus, during the 1960s, psychologist Richard S. Lazarus demonstrated in a series of artfully designed experiments that viewing stressful films could induce powerful emotional and physiological responses that depended crucially on the viewer's appraisals, beliefs, and coping styles. Such findings led Lazarus in the 1980s to take a prominent role in defending the cognitivist position when it was disputed in a well-known debate with Robert Zajonc. During these same years, social constructionists and other appraisal theorists also supported the cognitivist position. But for various reasons, including especially Ekman's advocacy and the results of his highly productive laboratory research program, Tomkins's approach began to displace the cognitivist model, with the result that starting in the 1980s his had become the mainstream position. This meant that when in 1994 Fridlund published his critique of the theoretical and empirical claims underpinning the Tomkins–Ekman paradigm, he was taking on a highly entrenched position. The same year, in a superb analysis of the cross-cultural judgment studies that had been reported by Ekman and his colleagues, Russell showed that the results were artifactual, depending on forced-choice response formats and other problematic methods that begged the questions to be proved in ways that fundamentally undermined Ekman's claims for the universality of the basic emotions.

Fridlund went on to propose that facial movements should not be viewed as expressions of hardwired, discrete internal emotions leaking out into the external world, as Tomkins and Ekman claimed, but as intentional behaviors that have evolved in order to communicate motives in an ongoing interpersonal or interindividual context or transaction. From this perspective, one that linked up with a "new ethology" that likewise emphasized the communicative value of nonhuman animal displays, facial
displays are relational signals that take other (real or imagined) organisms into account. According to Fridlund, humans and nonhuman animals produce facial behaviors or displays when it is strategically advantageous for them to do so and not at other times, because displays are dynamic and often highly plastic social and communicative signals. In short, Fridlund made the question of intentionality—including nonhuman animal intentionality—central to his account of the emotions. Russell, too, as we have seen, as well as scientists such as José-Miguel Fernández-Dols. Lisa Feldman Barrett, and Brian Parkinson, have all raised objections to the Ekman affect program theory and have proposed alternative approaches that challenge the disjunction between emotion and meaning on which the highly successful Tomkins–Ekman paradigm rests.

The present situation therefore offers to the historian the engrossing phenomenon of an ongoing clash between competing ways of thinking about the emotions. What is especially striking is that some of the researchers who have been formed by and trained in Ekman’s presuppositions and methods have voiced misgivings about the anti-intentionalist position. But as powerful and even intellectually decisive as these scientists’ objections may be, for reasons I will be examining, it will not be easy for them to overthrow Ekman’s views. How long this state of affairs will prevail is an open question. Nor will it be simple for critics to come up with viable alternative models of the emotions, not only because intentionality is an intrinsically difficult topic and theorizing its role a challenging task, but it is not clear how best to operationalize intentionalist views in terms compatible with scientific requirements—more on this later.

A GENEALOGY OF RESEARCH ON THE EMOTIONS

In the following book, I offer a history of post–World War II theoretical and experimental approaches to the emotions against the background of the conceptual and epistemological issues and concerns I have just sketched. Although numerous books on the emotions have appeared in recent years, none has attempted to understand the present quandary in the emotion sciences from a genealogical perspective. Of course, brief histories of emotion research are included in many surveys of psychology written by psychologists as introductory texts. Moreover, as a result of the burgeoning interest in the emotions by historians, there now exist several valuable studies that shed light on the nature of various emotional communities or modes of feeling in the past. What has been missing is an investigation that takes the recent emotion sciences as its principal object of inquiry, and that is what I intend to provide. I do not aim at comprehensiveness: the literature on the emotions is so vast and the proliferation of new articles so rapid that it would be an impossible task. Instead, in what is a work of intellectual history, I have focused on a select number of exemplary figures and episodes in the postwar history of approaches to the affects in order to throw light on the empirical, conceptual, and epistemological questions that have repeatedly surfaced.

In many respects, my choices regarding what to include are not controversial. For the most part, I have selected for discussion what are widely considered the chief episodes or figures in the past fifty or more years of research. But there are some important topics I have had to leave out. For instance, precisely because I am chiefly interested in laboratory and experimental contributions, I have touched only lightly and in passing on the large literature of social constructionism. Luckily this is a topic that has been ably discussed by Jan Plamper in his recent introduction to the history of the emotions. There are also some matters I have chosen


to highlight in ways others might not have done. For example, I have devoted two chapters to Fridlund’s work and responses to it, both because, as a former student of Ekman, his attempt to dismantle the latter’s affect program theory from the “inside” is significant, and because his analyses raise instructive questions about what kind of science of the emotions is possible, once the presuppositions animating Ekman’s paradigm are abandoned. In other words, I have operated on the assumption that Fridlund is “good to think with” when it comes to assessing debates over the nature of emotion. I not only regard his research and writings as important contributions to the recent history of empirical work on the affects, I treat the various responses to his work as a kind of litmus test of how scientists are handling the conceptual and empirical issues raised by his critique.

My book is divided into the following chapters:

In chapter 1, I discuss the work of Silvan S. Tomkins, who helped reinvigorate the study of the emotions in the 1960s by proposing a new theory of affect. I show how, through the twin influences of Darwin and the new science of cybernetics, Tomkins proposed the existence of a limited number of universal “affect programs” or basic emotions, which he theorized as innately triggered responses that functioned independently of objects or cognitions. Through his influence especially on Ekman and Izard, Tomkins set the stage for the emergence of an influential noncognitive paradigm of the emotions.

In chapter 2, I continue the story of the affect program theory by focusing on the work of Paul Ekman, arguably the most influential figure in emotion science to this day. I explain that according to Ekman’s “neurocultural” version of Tomkins’s theory, we expand through socialization the range of stimuli that can elicit the affect programs and can learn voluntarily to moderate our facial movements according to the conventions of “display rules.” But under certain conditions the underlying affect program phenomena will betray themselves, sometimes in micro movements of the face discernible only to the trained expert. In order to clarify the methodological issues at stake in Ekman’s research, I discuss some of the problems raised by his use of photographs of posed facial expressions as an experimental tool. I explore the implications of the fundamental physiognomic assumption underlying Ekman’s work in this regard, namely, the idea that a distinction can be strictly maintained between authentic and artificial expressions of emotion based on differences between the faces we make when we are alone and those we make when we are with others. Throughout my discussion, I aim to bring out some of the tensions and contradictions inherent in Ekman’s affect program model. I conclude the chapter with a discussion of the influential neuroscientist Antonio Damasio’s related claims about the emotions.

Richard Lazarus played a very important role in the post–World War II history of research on the emotions, and for this reason I have devoted two chapters to his work. In chapter 3, I confront head-on the challenges Lazarus faced in his attempts to provide a cognitive account of the emotions. I show that Lazarus’s ideas about the role of “appraisal” in emotion were often tentative and confused, in part because of the difficulty he had in deciding what kind of claim it is that emotions are intentional states or actions. Is the claim fundamentally a constitutive-conceptual one, according to which it belongs to the very “grammar” of the emotions that they are intentional states? Or is it a causal claim about how emotions are aroused? Are those two kinds of claims incompatible, or can one adopt both a conceptual-grammatical and a causal explanation of the affects? Lazarus did not find it easy to answer these questions, even as he pursued a major research program designed to do so. The aim of this chapter is to examine Lazarus’s experiments on the emotions and appraisal in light of these difficulties.

In chapter 4, I examine the famous 1980s debate between Lazarus and Robert Zajonc over the role of cognition in emotion. I emphasize the role of information-processing theories of the mind in enabling Zajonc to propose a noncognitive theory of the affects in terms not unlike those of Tomkins. In this connection, I discuss James S. Uleman and John A. Bargh’s Unintended Thought (1998) for the light it throws on the pervasiveness of information-processing ideas about the automaticity and non-intentionality of many mental functions. And I analyze Lazarus’s several attempts to rebut Zajonc, based in part on his criticisms of computer models of mentation, models to which, somewhat incoherently, his own thought also fell captive. Throughout this chapter, I hope to make clear the difficulties facing Lazarus in his attempt to incorporate intentionality and meaning into a science of the emotions.

In chapter 5, I focus on Fridlund’s critique of Ekman’s Basic Emotion Theory. I suggest that one reason for the success of Ekman’s theory is that it appears to solve the problem of deception in everyday life by suggesting that expressions have evolved to convey accurate information to others about our internal emotional states. On this model, although we are able to disguise our feelings through the voluntary management of our facial signals, under the right conditions the emotional truth of our inner states will betray itself. It is on the basis of this model that Ekman has played an influential role in federally funded post-9/11 surveillance research designed to find ways to identify terrorists before they can act. Ekman’s goal
is to ameliorate fears about our own tendencies to dissimulate, by providing a technological means by which authentic facial expressions can be reliably distinguished from false ones, the genuine from the feigned.

But on evolutionary, ethological, and other grounds, Fridlund has challenged that assumption. The purpose of chapter 5 is thus to lay out the essence of Fridlund's arguments and to examine the evidence he cites in support of his views. I also analyze the details of Fridlund's dismantling of one of Ekman's famous experiments on emotion, a by-now-iconic experiment on which so much of the validity of the affect program theory has been seen to depend. At the end of the chapter, I discuss Ekman's various attempts to respond to Fridlund's criticisms, attempts that reveal the contradictions and slippages inherent in the former's version of Tomkins's affect program theory.

In chapter 6, I address the question of whether Fridlund's interventions, as well as the contributions of others who have recently criticized Ekman's model of the emotions, herald a paradigm change in the emotion field or whether instead it is business as usual, in the sense that the affect program theory continues to dominate the field. In order to understand the current situation, I define certain features of Fridlund's position that, in his own words, make it a "tough sell" even if, in my view, those features reflect something incontestably right about his arguments. In order to throw further light on the recalcitrance of those committed to Ekman's views, I discuss in detail the recent writings of the author Paul Griffiths. Along with his colleague Andrea Scarantino, and in response to the critiques offered by Fridlund and others, these authors have offered a spirited defense of the basic emotion approach in psychology. The writings of Griffiths and Scarantino are especially interesting because they reveal how fundamental is the need to deflate claims about the intentionality of the emotions by retheorizing the intentional behaviors emphasized by Fridlund in non-intentional terms. How successful these authors are in this effort at retheorization is another matter.

In recent years, the topic of emotion has attracted more and more attention from cultural critics and theorists, and the purpose of my final chapter is to explore the terms in which this turn to affect has been taking place. In particular, I wish to understand why the anti-intentionalism that has informed so much of the work on the emotions in the psychological sciences now exerts such a fascination for scholars in the humanities and social sciences, whether they borrow from Tomkins's or Ekman's emotion theories or from ideas about affect originating in the work of Gilles Deleuze and related figures. I offer my analysis in the spirit of a "history of the present," that is, as an attempt to understand the rise of a non-intentionalist "affect theory" in the light of the genealogy I have charted and to explain why I think the views being forwarded are a mistake. I examine some of the scientific research cited by such affect theorists in support of their ideas in order to see how well that research stands up to scrutiny, and I draw out the aesthetic, political, and philosophical implications of their views.

Finally, I bring the different threads of my argument together in a short epilogue. In 2015, just as I was finalizing the draft of this book, some of the chief scientists in the long-standing dispute over the nature of the emotions—Fridlund, Russell, and Daniel Cordaro (the last are followers of Ekman's basic emotions model)—were invited by Scarantino, editor of Emotion Researcher, the newsletter of the International Society for Research on Emotion, to publish online statements concerning their respective views. In addition, Scarantino posed questions to these scientists, and the statements and the exchanges that ensued were also posted online. If Scarantino hoped that the debate would generate a consensus about the nature of emotion, he must have been disappointed, since no such consensus emerged. In my final comments, I take a brief look at this debate and say why I think this outcome was inevitable.